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Abstract: The philosopher Petar Bojanić advocates resistance of the architectural dis-
cipline to the philosophy of architecture. Using the technique of mise-en-scène, in “Think-
ing Architecture/Disciplining Architecture” (2015) Bojanić reaffirms that after architecture’s 
theoretical turn in the second half of the 20th century the architect is undoubtedly capable of 
theoretically thematizing his/her own work. I argue strongly that this implies, among other 
things, building a disciplinary language, which must reconcile, or at least balance between, the 
verbal and non-verbal form of expression. Also, I try to show that it is precisely theory that 
the architect has needed through history to establish the architectural discipline as liberal and 
autonomous.
In “The Real and the Theoretical” (2013) the philosopher from Belgrade stresses the 
tensions between reality and theory present in the work of the architect. Theorizing in the field 
of architecture carries a danger of severe detachment from currently important and pressing 
social problems. Since there is no discipline without a group and since architecture is defined 
as the art of community, architectural practice can be understood, as it is in “The Architectural 
Philosophy” (2013), as a spatial way of transforming society.
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As a sort of introduction to this essay, I would like to say that my intention is 
not to try to objectify the thought of Petar Bojanić on the question of architecture. The 
main reason for this decision is that I am dealing with the continuously developing 
and vital thought of this philosopher. Despite all efforts, at this moment it would be 
hard to predict the future course it will take, and it would not be possible to thorough-
ly expound on all of Bojanić’s reflections on this immense topic in a single exposition. 
Bojanić’s writing on architecture is quite multidirectional and my intention here is 
only to reflect on the statements I found essential and draw conclusions from them. 
Therefore, this essay will be only one of many possible avenues of interpretation.
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1.
From a metaphorical point of view, it is very easy and effective to imagine an 
introduction as a spatial object, as a certain architectural element – a portico or a ves-
tibule. Does every text on the topic of architecture have to be seen as an introduction 
to its realm? Bojanić presents many (but not all) of the ideas about architectural phe-
nomena in the form of introductory texts to the books he co-edited with the architect 
Vladan Đokić. Does a text with this function and communicational status have a right 
to claim the dignity of an important textual form? Such practice is indeed unusual.
The genesis of the prefaces written by Bojanić and Đokić from 2009 to 2014 can 
be metonymically followed by focusing on the structure of the titles they bear. The 
first one is simply titled “A Word of Introduction”. The second one has the same title 
but is supplemented with the subtitle “On the City, On the Thought of the City”. They 
are followed by “On the Architect’s Word as the Architectural Act”, “What is an Ar-
chitectural Gesture?” and “The Architectural Philosophy”. In their last joint work, the 
intricateness of title reaches its full capacity in “Technique as the First of Institution-
alized Action: On the First or Second Attempt of Building”. The complexity and the 
variation of the titles are correlatively followed by the increasingly complex structure 
of the texts they announce.
The institution of the preface is a place where a philosopher becomes just an au-
thor, where the philosophical text confronts its material and communicational bound-
aries. It logically precedes the purity of philosophical discourse and is exterior to it: 
“In the introduction, it is the philosopher who speaks; in the preface, it is the author 
of the book.”1 However, the prefaces I am talking about are not pure prefaces. There 
are at least two arguments for this assertion: a) they do not only anticipate particular 
texts which follow them in the books they separately open, but also problematize the 
very concept of architecture from the perspective of their universal validity; the theo-
retical dimension of these prefaces raises them to the level of the general introduction 
to the problem of architecture; b) they can stand by themselves independently of the 
original place of their publication and surpass their occasional function.2
It can be said that almost all of these prefaces have the same purpose: to insist 
on the legitimate request that the architect should not mutely act and must be able 
to verbally and theoretically thematize his or her work. Each of them accentuates a 
specific aspect of the architectural occupation, directly or indirectly related to this 
postulate. In the introductory piece of writing titled “What is an Architectural Ges-
ture?” it is observed that the most desirable and convenient form for architectural 
1 Jean-Marie Schaeffer, “Note sur la préface philosophique,” Poetique 69 (1987): 37.
2 The important text “The Architectural Philosophy”, which should be seen as a paper in which the ideas from 
the prefaces written earlier culminate, and which was originally published as the clarifying introduction to the 
series of conversations with architectural thinkers gathered in the Proceedings of the international conference 
Architecture of Deconstruction held in Belgrade in October 2012, was published later on without any problems 
in the form of a separate study (“La Philosophia Architettonica”) in the journal Rivista di Estetica (1, 2015).
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expression is a short one.3 This verbal economy points out the forcefully terse way of 
exposing the subject matter and, at the same time, points to the exterior side of every 
verbal expression, to the broadness of space where every utterance about this topic 
confronts its limit.
Analogically, other Bojanić texts on this subject – that is, those not written in 
collaboration with Vladan Đokić – are also written in a short form. I refer here to 
“Quotings”, “The Real and the Theoretical” and “Thinking Architecture/Disciplining 
Architecture”. Why does Bojanić insist on a short form of expression? I believe that 
because architecture is a non-discursive art this philosopher aims to intentionally lim-
it the scope of architectural discourse and to acknowledge the existence of the linguis-
tically ineffable in the realm of architecture. However, since there is no architecture 
without the discourse then theoretical writing on this topic should be presented in an 
effective form. When it comes to architecture, the introductory and/or short forms 
have a performative potential different from the one that more closed and voluminous 
texts have. Will Bojanić ever write an organically structured book that will be entirely 
dedicated to architecture? I must emphasize that this question interests me on the 
level of logic. Is such a project conceivable with his approach? Should it be expected? 
Is such a hope justified or is this a priori in vain?
The philosopher sententiously declares: “The first space of philosophy and ar-
chitecture – THE ROAD.”4  But where does this road come from and where does it 
go? Is the introduction necessarily the beginning of the road? The introduction is a 
form which is insisted on precisely because a pure beginning in fact does not exist.5 To 
insist on the road which opens the writing of introductions means to avoid the effect 
of originality of commencing. Each text with the intention to thematize the architec-
tural phenomenon must be perceived as an introduction to it, even if this goes against 
its original intention. It would be legitimate to take the next step and, because of the 
very nature of the topic in question, to say that each text about architecture is just a 
discursive introductory form to a space which is not built only of pure concepts.
2.
The theoretical turn in architecture in the second half of the 20th century made 
firmly evident that the architect is a thinker capable of thematizing his or her work: 
3 Petar Bojanić, Vladan Đokić, “Šta jeste arhitekturalni gest?,” in Arhitektura kao gest (Beograd: Arhitektonski 
fakultet, 2012), 11.
4 Petar Bojanić, “Navođenja,” Polja, 394 (1991): 459.
5 In the text “Realism: institution and corporation” it is confidently stated that “there is no first step, but always 
and only the next step”. Petar Bojanić, O institucionalnom delovanju (Novi Sad, Beograd: Akademska knjiga, 
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2016), 165. (The english verson of the book is to be published by Vitto-
rio Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.)
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“Indeed, today the philosopher is awakened in the architect.”6 I think it is important 
to focus attention on the verb which Bojanić justifiably uses when talking about this 
recent ‘dramatic’ turning point. The usage of “to awake” (“risvegliare”) indicates that 
the figure of the theoretician has always been present through history in the figure of 
the architect qua architect. 
Where does this statement draw its legitimacy from? Bojanić is absolutely right 
when he claims that there is no discipline without its history. The genesis of the archi-
tectural discipline has been philosophico-theoretically conditioned. With the preten-
sion to gain a better and acceptable social status, the architect had to show and prove 
that his enterprise could not be reduced to mere fabrica or the category of armatura, 
that behind it an intellectual endeavour is present, which separates it from the so-
called ‘mechanical’ arts and manual work. In order to be respected as such in the 
community, the architect had to become a figure with knowledge of theory and the 
ability to express himself conceptually. Actually, it was the mutism of the builder that 
prevented him from becoming the architect, or – as Bojanić concisely said – from 
coming out of anonymity. The emancipation of this discipline has been possible, in 
that direction, through his theoretical activity. The recognition of the architectural 
discipline as intellectual and liberal took place for the first time in Italy of the 16th 
century. Once the aforesaid distinction was made, the investigation of the theoretical 
aspect of the architect’s profession had been introduced in the process of his educa-
tion, beside the practical or the technical one.7
Apart from the continual need for the (re)constitution of autonomous architec-
tural terminology and language, and, generally speaking, its coherent body of theory, 
to be a discipline for architecture means that its disciplinary knowledge can be rigor-
ously taught to students and as such transmitted through time and from one person 
to another. This fact indicates that architecture as a discipline has to necessarily imply 
a group of people and joint work as a condition for this project to be realized.
On the other hand, what is the relation of philosophy to architecture? Since 
its beginnings, philosophical discourse has included architectural metaphors inside 
itself; undoubtedly the dialogue Timaeus is one of the most sonorous examples, but 
the transcendental foundation of philosophical projects, from Descartes onwards, has 
provided the possibility of a firm establishment of the analogy between the activities 
of the architect and the philosopher. From that point of view a philosophical system 
must unconditionally rest upon the logic of its proper architectonics and must be 
6 Petar Bojanić, Vladan Đokić, “The Architectural Philosophy,” in AoD Interviews (Belgrade: Faculty of Archi-
tecture, 2013), 11.
7 Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts (I),” Journal of the History of Ideas 12, 4 (1951): 514. On 
the other hand, it is an interesting and significant fact that education in architecture in Serbia was introduced for 
the first time precisely within the Department of Philosophy, with the reform of the Lyceum in Belgrade (1841), 
and this school subject carried the title “civil architecture”. Jovan Milićević, “Razvoj nastave arhitekture na visokim 
školama u Srbiji (1841–1914),” Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta 13 (1976): 175.
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categorically built up and developed in accordance with its fundamental basis.8 By 
moving the focus to the constructivist subjectivity, reality has to appear as a mental-
ly-constructed phenomenon.
In the philosophy of transcendentalism, the central text where essential mo-
ments are presented (and not at all accidentally) in a form of architectural and urban-
istic terminology is Discourse on the Method. Descartes here and elsewhere mostly in-
sists on the figure of ‘foundation’, followed by geometaphors of soil or bedrock, whose 
security and solidity serve, figuratively speaking, as the basis for a reliable philosoph-
ical reflection. Descartes’ approach can be adequately described by using the figure of 
the city: the most beautiful is the city built from the beginning on an empty plain, as 
a product of a rational geometric plan.9 In addition to the urbanistic and architectural 
ones and in correlation with them, the metaphors of road (right or wrong) and jour-
ney (even the term “method” from the title contains the word ὁδός as its root, which 
means journey, way or road) are also vastly exploited.
In a way, architecture and philosophy both signify the project of a thoughtful 
building of rational structures. The very idea that philosophy can allow itself such spatial 
metaphors points to its relationship with architecture as a spatial art. Petar Bojanić un-
doubtedly follows the constructivist principle in his approach, but shifts focus from the 
ego logical perspective of transcendental subjectivity to the ontology of social objects.
Architecture can be and is a philosophical topic, but can architecture take itself as 
a topic? For a discipline to establish itself as autonomous it has to provide its own theo-
retical basis. Bojanić affirms that thematization or self-thematization of architecture and 
the architect leads to the institutionalization of this discipline in its autonomy.10 In the 
previous sentence the conjunction ‘or’ corresponds to Bojanić’s intentional ambivalence 
about the nature of the agent who would perform this act or project of institutionali-
zation. Is the philosopher then the main agent or does he only have a supporting role 
in this action? In “Thinking Architecture/Disciplining Architecture”, exactly where the 
statement in question is found, the whole real mise-en-scène with the figures of philoso-
pher and architect is effectively constructed. The end of this text, in fact its last sentence, 
explicitly reveals that the philosopher is the one who is retreating in front of the architect 
in an optimistic and promising way (adesso, ora...). A philosopher should construct and 
provide a theoretical basis for the process of self-thematization of the architect, and then 
go off the stage on which he would play the role of the architect’s fundamental source.
As philosophy is capable of self-foundation and of constructing a framework 
and creating space for other disciplines and genres of knowledge to be firmly found-
ed, it has the legitimate right, even the task, to do the same with architecture. But an 
8 In a response to objections by Pierre Bourdin to the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes explicitly says: 
“Everywhere in my writings I made it clear that my procedure was like that of Architects planning houses.” Des-
cartes, The Philosophical Works, vol. II (New York: Dover, 1955), 325. (Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. VII /Paris: Léopold 
Cerf, 1904/, 536.) In the polemical exchange, which was printed in the second edition of the treatise, the philos-
opher describes his opponent as a common bricklayer who is not able to understand the architect’s construction. 
9 Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. VI (Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1902), 11. 
10 Petar Bojanić, “Disciplinare l’architettura/pensare l’architettura,” Aut Aut 368 (2015): 54–55. 
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important problem is set in front of Bojanić: how to save this foundational and limi-
tational role of philosophy and simultaneously avoid its hierarchically structured and 
dominative intention? The answer is found in Bojanić’s assertion that the architect 
is by his or her immanent nature the architect-philosopher, a figure competent to 
confidently provoke and challenge a philosopher’s assertions. One thing is absolutely 
irrefutable in this case. Bojanić’s scene with the characters of the architect and the 
philosopher is philosophically directed and constructed. Architecture cannot be lib-
erated from the philosophical grip without its support. The shadow of the philosopher 
or theoretician will always lean over the figure of the architect.
3.
Our knowledge of the past of the institution of architecture is mostly based 
on preserved monuments, but also on the documents in which the presence of the 
architectural institution is officially confirmed in a written form. Moreover, some very 
important early facts about its genesis are available through records in the form of 
building inscriptions which contain written contracts or the architect’s specifications 
(συγγραφή). Not only that written documents serve as verbal evidence about the his-
tory of the discipline – they precisely institutionalize the occupation of the architect. 
Today it is impossible to be an architect without registration in a bureau or studio, 
signing contracts and other administrative and transcendental requirements, which 
– Bojanić strongly claims – somehow make architects exist and provides the endur-
ance of their profession. Because of that “the form of text or expression in space”11 are 
equally significant for them.
In order to present their work in a correct and effective way, architects should 
connect both of these aspects. In building a disciplinary language, the architect must 
reconcile, or at least balance between, verbal and non-verbal forms of expression. Se-
bastiano Serlio, for example, left a mark in the history of architecture, not because of the 
objects he built, but because he wrote I sette libri dell’ architettura, an influential treatise. 
On the contrary, his contemporary Giulio Romano did not leave a single piece of writ-
ing, but the history of this discipline is unimaginable without his Palazzo del Te.
In the text “On the Architect’s Word as the Architectural Act”, whose title el-
oquently confirms and underlines its main thesis right from the start, it is affirmed 
that, over the last decades in the realm of “the prose of the world”, many architects 
have frequently been comparing architectural structures with structures of language.
“Arrangement and (dis)harmony of elements in space, on the basis of this logic, 
could be analogous to arrangement of signs in text or to order of phonemes and signs 
in language.”12 
11 Petar Bojanić, Vladan Đokić, “The Architectural Philosophy,” 16. 
12 Petar Bojanić, Vladan Đokić, “O reči arhitekte kao arhitekturalnom aktu,” in Dijalozi sa arhitektama (Be-
ograd: Arhitektonski fakultet, 2011), 9.
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From this passage at least one important conclusion can be deduced. The re-
lation between architecture and language corresponds to the relation of analogy, not 
identity. Analogical transfer clearly presupposes the existence of a similarity between 
two entities. In this case, the comparison is made on the assumption that both systems 
have a codified set of repetitive elements to be compounded in order to build more 
complex structures. Consequently, talking about architectural language is justified, 
because it possesses its proper elements and units (for example, arch, vault, cornice, 
entablature or bay, facade, corridor, terrace and so on).
It is true that composition of elements requires the rule of sequence. In order for 
somebody to be able to think, temporal sequentiality is a priori required for this process 
of composition of words and phrases, which corresponds to the process of development 
of thought. It is not possible, for example, to say at the same time architecture and theory; 
one word must follow the other. But the situation appears to be more complicated when 
it comes to architectural language (or better said, its languages). Unlike the linguistic 
one, architectural arrangement can present itself simultaneously. The philosopher or 
theoretician needs the temporal form of exposition for the verbalization of his thoughts, 
the architect not so much; he or she is a figure who thinks more spatially, whose ideas 
and plans must find their expression and realization in space.
Finally, what is architectural language? Does the architect speak more than one 
language? Are they translatable, and in what measure? How does the architect balance 
between them? It is clear that, unlike the second one, only the first is verbal in na-
ture. Bojanić makes the essential difference in this context between “utterance” (iskaz) 
and “expression” (izraz). Although both belong to the category of architectural act 
or gesture, it is clear that the first one is only verbal in nature, unlike the second one. 
Therefore, being an architect implies a capacity “to move from one system of signs to 
another”13. He or she has to count on the parallelism or, more complicatedly, inter-
twinement of the different forms of expression and different kinds of vocabularies. 
If there are two forms of language in the work of the architect, the verbal and 
non-verbal, which one has ontological priority? In other words, the question is which 
form is the original or primordial one. From Bojanić’s point of view, this dilemma ap-
pears to be meaningless. He argues elsewhere (in the essay “Quid pro quo”) that “what 
is being translated is already a translation of something else”14. It turns out that the 
original is always mediated. Logically speaking, the mute expression in space neither 
precedes nor comes after the architect’s verbal and conceptual occupation. 
Furthermore, I am interested in the concept of untranslatability that Bojanić 
uses in the aforementioned essay. It is precisely the phenomenon of the untranslatable 
(l’intraducibile) which secures the existence of two simultaneous architectural forms of 
language. If it ceased to exist, this discipline would become absolutely transparent and 
theoretically uninteresting. Also, it leads to the point where the theoretico-discursive 
13 Petar Bojanić, Vladan Đokić, “Reč uvoda,” in Teorija arhitekture i urbanizma (Beograd: Arhitektonski 
fakultet, 2009), 9. 
14 Petar Bojanić, Violenza e messianismo (Milano, Udine: Mimesis, 2014), 47. 
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articulation of architectural phenomena reaches its limit. Architecture is not a disci-
pline opposed to philosophy, but rather different only to a certain extent. I think it is 
precisely the non-discursiveness of architectural objects (the non-conceptual nature 
of their appearance) that is a specific quality by which the work of the architect con-
fronts the work of the philosopher. Their final products are not of the same nature. In 
a literal sense, the architectural object is not built of verbal signs; it mutely occupies a 
certain place without necessarily containing words. On the other hand, philosophy or 
theory is a rigorously discursive discipline.
 
4.
Every discipline has to imply a group or collectivity of subjects. As Bojanić argues, 
only from this perspective and through the procedures it requires to be constructed as 
such can the architectural discipline institutionalize itself as a ‘social fact’ and ‘social 
factor’. Architectural activity is always a social action; to design and to build is always for 
the other, for somebody who will dwell or work in a certain building or a city as a whole 
(near us, you, me, them). Moreover, the situation becomes more complex concerning 
the contextual field the architect (or, consequently and more adequately said, architects) 
must approach and move through. Being truly an art of community and in compari-
son to other art forms, architecture affects a fortiori the largest number of its members. 
Because of that, and not only because of that, every architectural gesture is a social act.
This position should undoubtedly oblige architects to act responsibly in their 
enterprises, also in expressing their statements and viewpoints on this issue. Archi-
tects must try as much as they can to act as morally autonomous and socially aware 
figures, not simply as anonymous actors whose task is reduced to material verification 
of existing social and economic constellations, as if those were unchangeable.
In the mid-20th century, Ortega y Gasset noticed the potential self-destructivity 
of liberal professions in the epoch of anonymous collectivity. On the other hand, in 
an annex to his participation in the “Darmstadt Conversations” in 1951 and first pub-
lished in Tangier later on, he spoke about architecture as an “art of community” (arte 
colectivo), as an expression of “collective intentions” (intenciones colectivas) and about 
buildings as an immense, in a certain manner ineffable, “social gesture” (inmenso ges-
to social).15 Needless to say, the content of this reasoning is very similar to Bojanić’s 
approach to the role of architecture, and any coincidence between them is not at all 
contingent with regard to the current framework of socio-ontological analysis.  
Petar Bojanić is aware of the danger of the architect’s fall or decline into ano-
nymity. Non-linguistic or generally non-reflective modes of architects’ behaviour in 
relation to his or her social circumstances, among other things, leads to the absence 
of their social or political – in a word, public – engagement and leads their work to an 
avenue without a name.
15 Cf. José Ortega y Gasset, “Las professiones liberales,” and “Anejo: en torno al ‘Coloquio de Darmstadt, 1951’,” 
in Obras completas, tomo IX (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1965), 691–706. and 626f. 
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“We suggest this critique of the architect’s or architecture’s engagement be 
called the social gesture, or more precisely, that a key characteristic of architecture as 
a gesture or the gesture as the key to architecture, is resistance towards structures and 
hierarchies of our time. The gesture has social value and importance, if characterized 
by resistance (the architect is certainly one of the key actors in society who produces 
such gestures).”16
But how it is possible to defend at the same time the principles of architectural 
autonomy and the ability of architecture to reflect and impact on politics? At first, the 
so-called formal critique is necessary to strictly differentiate and establish architectur-
al elements in their formal specificity. On the other hand, if architecture has a capacity 
to resist “towards structures and hierarchies of our time” and to actively transform 
them, it does not, therefore, only express itself and nothing else. It is argued that ex-
actly this contradiction reveals the impossibility to apprehend architecture in a defin-
itive manner and in its totality. Although le silence des formes exists, it only appears 
inside the dialectic of the social. In other words, “everything which is indispensable to 
architecture is precisely everything which does not concern it”17. It is the resistance to 
the political in the name of the political.
5.
In this theatrum mundi the philosopher and the architect share the same pur-
pose in their missions, which somehow transcend the boundaries of their respective 
fields: it is a care for public good. The city is a category in which such concern finds its 
most manifest dimension. In the text “‘We’ who dwell: the necessity of philosophy of 
city” Bojanić asserts that philosophy is always civic – that is to say, the public and the 
philosopher simultaneously propose and call for the idea of “engaged dwelling”.18 On 
the other hand, we have seen that there is no architecture without a group and that it 
is defined as the art of community.
“Secondly: an architect or the group of architects are a social fact only to the 
extent to which they produce protocols of responsibility for all the parts of the society 
or city and for the recognition of public goods and public interest.”19
Buildings are real objects in space, an inevitable part of our daily life and ac-
tions. Concurrently, the essence of the city cannot be reduced to the sum of buildings. 
Nevertheless, its presence is an integral part of the reality we are living in. Every citi-
zen, guided by his or her experience, should be engaged and participate in the project 
of making cities more livable for everyone, but it is especially an ethical obligation for 
16 Petar Bojanić, Vladan Đokić, “The Architectural Philosophy,” 16. 
17 Massimo Scolari, “Les Apories de l’Architecture,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui 190 (1977): 89.
18 Petar Bojanić, “ ‘Noi’ che abitiamo: modi di convivenza nella città,” in Carla Danani, ed., I luoghi e gli altri 
(Roma: Aracne, 2016), 21–32.
19 Petar Bojanić, “Disciplinare l’architettura/pensare l’architettura,” 54. 
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architects and philosophers to face this reality – as Bojanić says – to protect “il inter-
esse pubblico”, or as Silvia Malcovati states – to build “a better world”20. 
“The real or the realism clearly asks for the cooperative action (working togeth-
er) (not just the presence of a world, with or without quotation marks), the consid-
eration of a context, as well as collective dimension, or global if you prefer, a radical 
change of the given, of the context (global or local), of the inadequate.”21
It is important to say that social acts are not always verbal acts, no matter how 
fundamental they are; words are only one kind among others. Social transformation 
is also possible in a mute manner, through realizations of architectural and urbanistic 
projects as a material way to non-discursively transform public and private spaces. 
This logic in no way excludes a theoretical approach to this problem from its horizons, 
una svolta verso la teoria is absolutely justified. But it is also true that every theorizing 
signifies a dead end. “The Real and the Theoretical” stresses the tension between real-
ity and theory present in the work of the architect and the latent anti-realism in every 
discourse on architecture, because the horizon of social reality cannot be reduced to 
its verbal representation.
Theorizing in the field of architecture carries a danger of severe detachment from 
the currently important and pressing problems in society. On the contrary, the opin-
ion of David Leatherbarrow that “the real task of reflection within the discipline is to 
witness and comprehend the emergence of both ideas and buildings from the cultural 
context that endows them with vital significance”, or that, again phenomenologically 
speaking, “reflection in architecture should become less theoretical, that it needs to be 
regrounded within a horizon of typical life situations”, seems very valid.22 To penetrate 
into this radical reality which serves as architecture’s prefiguration is an initiative worth 
accomplishing and it is a serious and inspiring task, because “l’iniziativa è sempre un 
inizio, un nuovo inizio, un manifesto, una disciplina, ma anche un’iniziazione”23.
If every text on architecture has to be seen as the verbal introduction to a space 
whose essential part consists of non-verbal material elements and constructions, then 
this principal designation – which I propose – does not mean that all the texts written 
about architectural phenomena must be seen as inherently unfinished, like, for exam-
ple, a half-finished building. This logic only suggests that there is always something 
more to say about the subject in question, because the formal language of architectur-
al objects is not verbal in its nature: it is silent and spatial.
On the other hand, the demand for the autonomy of architecture and its disci-
plinary specificity does not necessarily nullify the socially and politically responsible 
role of architects in this Great Theater of the World. Architectural reflection on social 
20 Silvia Malcovati, “The Utopia of Reality,” Serbian Architectural Journal 6, 2 (2014): 160.
21 Petar Bojanić, “Il Reale e il Teorico,” in Silvia Malcovati, ed., Architettura e realismo (Milano: Maggioli Edi-
tore, 2013), 111.
22 David Leatherbarrow, “Architecture is its own Discipline,” in: Andrzej Piotrowski and Julia Williams Robin-
son, ed., The Discipline of Architecture (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2001), 95, 101.
23 Petar Bojanić, “Il Reale e il Teorico,” 107.
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reality is only possible through reflection on its own internal reality.24 The second 
approach, which consists of the theoretical and spatial self-thematization of architec-
ture, does not exclude the first, socially aware approach; on the contrary, it is about 
two avenues irresistibly converging toward each other.
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